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ACCELERATING AI 
John O. McGinnis* 
Recently, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become a subject of major 
media interest.  For instance, last May the New York Times devoted an ar-
ticle to the prospect of the time at which AI equals and then surpasses hu-
man intelligence.1  The article speculated on the dangers that such an event 
and its ―strong AI‖ might bring.2  Then in July, the Times discussed com-
puter-driven warfare.  Various experts expressed concern about the growing 
power of computers, particularly as they become the basis for new wea-
pons, such as the predator drones that the United States now uses to kill ter-
rorists.3 
These articles encapsulate the twin fears about AI that may impel regu-
lation in this area—the existential dread of machines that become uncon-
trollable by humans and the political anxiety about machines’ destructive 
power on a revolutionized battlefield.  Both fears are overblown.  The exis-
tential fear is based on the mistaken notion that strong artificial intelligence 
will necessarily reflect human malevolence.  The military fear rests on the 
mistaken notion that computer-driven weaponry will necessarily worsen, ra-
ther than temper, human malevolence.  In any event, given the centrality of 
increases in computer power to military technology, it would be impossible 
to regulate research into AI without empowering the worst nations on earth. 
Instead of prohibiting or heavily regulating artificial intelligence, the 
United States should support civilian research into a kind of AI that will not 
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best way to make sure that computers do not turn out to be an existential 
threat.  It would provide incentives for researchers in the most technologi-
cally advanced nation in the world to research and develop AI that is friend-
ly to man. 
Second, such support is justified because of the positive spillovers that 
computational advances will likely provide in collective decisionmaking.  
The acceleration of technology creates the need for quicker government 
reaction to the potentially huge effects of disruptive innovations.  For in-
stance, at the dawn of the era in which the invention of energy-intensive 
machines may have started to warm up the earth, few recognized any risk 
from higher temperatures that such machines might cause.5  Yet as I will 
describe below, current developments in technology make the rise of ener-
gy-intensive machines seem slow-moving.  Assuming that man-made at-
mospheric warming is occurring,6 it likely presents only the first of a 
number of possible catastrophes generated by accelerating technological 
changedangers that may be prevented or at least ameliorated through ear-
lier objective analysis and warning.  But it is no less important to recognize 
that other technological advances may create a cascade of benefits for so-
ciety—benefits that false perceptions of risk may retard or even preclude.  
As a result, gathering and analyzing information quickly is more important 
than ever to democratic decisionmaking because the stakes of such regula-
tory decisions have never been higher. 
Given that AI has substantial potential to help society formulate the 
correct policies about all other accelerating technologies with transforma-
tional capacity, such as nanotechnology and biotechnology, the most impor-
tant policy for technological change is that for AI itself.  Strong AI would 
help analyze the data about all aspects of the world—data that is growing at 
an exponential rate.7  AI then may help make connections between policies 
and consequences that would otherwise go overlooked by humans, acting as 
a fire alarm against dangers from new technologies whose chain of effects 
may be hard to assess even if they are quite imminent in historical terms. 
Such analysis is not only useful to avoiding disaster but also to take 
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ter analysis of future consequences may help the government craft the best 
policy toward nurturing such beneficent technologies, including providing 
appropriate prizes and support for their development.  Perhaps more impor-
tantly, better analysis about the effects of technological advances will tamp 
down on the fears often sparked by technological change.  The better our 
analysis of the future consequences of current technology, the less likely it 
is that such fears will smother beneficial innovations before they can deliver 
Promethean progress. 
In this brief Essay, I first describe why strong AI has a substantial pos-
sibility of becoming a reality and then sketch the two threats that some as-
cribe to AI.  I show that relinquishing or effectively regulating AI in a 
world of competing sovereign states cannot respond effectively to such 
threats, given that sovereign states can gain a military advantage from AI, 
and that even within states, it would be very difficult to prevent individuals 
from conducting research into AI.  Moreover, I suggest that AI-driven ro-
bots on the battlefield may actually lead to less destruction, becoming a ci-
vilizing force in wars as well as an aid to civilization in its fight against 
terrorism.  Finally, I offer reasons that friendly artificial intelligence can be 
developed to help rather than harm humanity, thus eliminating the existen-
tial threat. 
I conclude by showing that, in contrast to a regime of prohibition or 
heavy regulation, a policy of government support for AI that follows prin-
ciples of friendliness is the best approach to artificial intelligence.  If friend-
ly AI emerges, it may aid in preventing the emergence of less friendly 
versions of strong AI, as well as distinguish the real threats from the many 
potential benefits inherent in other forms of accelerating technology. 
I. THE COMING OF AI 
The idea of artificial intelligence powerful enough to intervene in hu-
man affairs has been the stuff of science fiction from HAL in 2001: A Space 
Odyssey to the robots in Wall-E.8  The notion of computers that rival and 
indeed surpass human intelligence might first seem to be speculative fanta-
sy, rather than a topic that should become a salient item on the agenda of 
legal analysis and policy.9  But travel to the moon was itself once a staple of 
science fiction in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.10  Yet because of a 
single government program, man’s exploration of the moon is now a histor-
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the development of artificial intelligence has direct implications for social 
governance. 
Strong artificial intelligence is the creation of machines with the gener-
al human capacity for abstract thought and problem solving.  It is generally 
conceded that if such machines are possible, they would soon surpass hu-
man cognitive abilities because the same processes that gave rise to them 
could rapidly improve them.  The machines themselves could aid in this 
process with their greater-than-human capacity to share information among 
themselves.11 
The success of strong AI depends on the truth of three premises.  The 
first premise is functionalism.  Functionalism turns on the proposition that 
cognition is separate from the system in which cognition is realized.12  Thus, 
abstract thinking can be equally realized in a biological system like the 
brain or in an electronic one like a computer.  Under this hypothesis, a sys-
tem of symbols, when properly actualized by a physical process, is ―capable 
of intelligent action.‖13 
Philosopher John Searle is most prominent among scholars who chal-
lenge the notion that a machine manipulating abstract symbols can become 
the equivalent of a human mind.  Searle provides the analogy of a Chinese 
room.14  If someone is put in a room and asked questions in Chinese, he can 
be given written directions on how to manipulate Chinese characters so as 
to give answers to the questions in Chinese.15  Yet he himself understands 
nothing of Chinese and, as a result, this manipulation of symbols is a poor 
simulacrum of human understanding.16  One powerful objection to Searle’s 
analogy is that the entire system—the written directions plus the human 
manipulator—does understand Chinese.17  Searle thus unfairly anthropo-
morphizes the subject of understanding.  As I discuss below, confusing the 
proposition that AI may soon gain human capabilities with the proposition 
that AI may soon partake of human nature is the single greatest systemic 
mistake made in thinking about computational intelligence—an error that 
science fiction has perpetuated.18 
The second claim undergirding strong AI is that computers will have 
the hardware capacity to mimic human thought.  Raw computer power has 
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named after Gordon Moore, one of Intel’s founders, is the observation that 
the number of transistors fitting onto a computer chip doubles every eigh-
teen months to two years.19  This prediction, which has been approximately 
accurate for the last forty years, means that almost every aspect of the digi-
tal world—from computational calculation power to computer memory—is 
growing in density at a similarly exponential rate.20  Moore’s law reflects 
the rapid rise of computers as the fundamental engine of mankind in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.21 
The power of exponential growth is hard to overstate.  As Robert Lu-
cas once said in the economic context, once you start thinking about expo-
nential growth, ―it is hard to think about anything else.‖22  The 
computational power in a cell phone today is a thousand times greater and a 
million times less expensive than all of the computing power housed at MIT 
in 1965.23  Projecting forward, the computational power of computers thirty 
years from now is likely to prove a million times more powerful than that of 
computers today.24 
To be sure, some technology pundits have long been predicting the 
imminent death of Moore’s law, but it has nevertheless continued to flou-
rish.  Intel, a company that has a substantial interest in accurately telling 
software makers what to expect, projects that Moore’s law will continue un-
til at least 2029.25  Technology theorist and inventor Ray Kurzweil shows 
that Moore’s law is actually part of a more general exponential computation 
growth that has been gaining force for over one hundred years.26  Integrated 
circuits replaced transistors, which previously replaced vacuum tubes, 
which in their time had replaced electromechanical methods of computa-
tion.  Through all these changes in the mechanisms of computation, its 
power has increased at an exponential rate.27  This historical perspective 
suggests that new methods under research, from carbon nanotechnology to 





  See Moore’s Law: Made Real by Intel Innovation, http://www.intel.com/technology/mooreslaw 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (discussing Moore’s law, which predicts that the number of transistors on a 
silicon chip will roughly double every eighteen to twenty-four months, thus increasing microprocessor 
speed on a regular basis) (link). 
20
  See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1620 
n.147 (2003). 
21
  Cf. HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 379–90 (1918) (discussing the Virgin as 
the symbol of the Middle Ages and the steam engine as that of the nineteenth century). 
22
  Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. OF MONETARY ECON. 3, 
5 (1988) (link). 
23
  Ray Kurzweil, Making the World a Billion Times Better, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Apr. 13, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/11/AR2008041103326.html (link). 
24
  See HANS MORAVEC, ROBOT: MERE MACHINE TO TRANSCENDENT MIND 104–08 (1999). 
25
  Jeremy Geelan, Moore’s Law: “We See No End in Sight,” says Intel’s Pat Gelsinger, SOA 
WORLD MAGAZINE (May 1, 2008), available at http://java.sys-con.com/read/557154.html (link). 
26
  RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND BIOLOGY 67 (2005). 
27
  Id. 
104:366 (2010) Accelerating AI 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/12/ 371 
power to continue growing exponentially, even when silicon-based compu-
ting reaches its physical limits.28  Assuming the computational capacity of 
computers continues to grow as Moore’s law predicts, the hardware capaci-
ty of a computer is likely to achieve equality with a human brain between 
2025 and 2030.29  Even if this pace does not continue, it seems hard to be-
lieve that this capacity will not be reached by the midpoint of this century. 
The third issue is whether programmers will be able to provide the 
software to convert the gains in hardware to make advances in AI.  No 
doubt there are daunting challenges ahead in creating software that can un-
derstand the complex realities captured by human thought.  In fact, some 
have argued that despite the previous growth in computational capacity, AI 
has been largely a failure with little to show for fifty years of work.30  This 
assessment seems far too harsh.  Since 1997, computers have been able to 
defeat the greatest chess players in the world.31  Cars run by computers can 
autonomously navigate city traffic.32  These feats can hardly be dismissed as 
powerful examples of intelligent behavior.  Of course, it is true that chess is 
a completely formal system and even driving has a limited—although more 
unpredictable—problem set to be solved.  But it is hardly surprising that ar-
tificial intelligence proceeds from creating intelligence in more formal and 
predictable environments to doing so in more informal and fluid ones.  In 
any event, software progress continues in tandem with the growing hard-
ware capability.33 
My point here is not to prove that general AI will succeed in replicat-
ing and then surpassing human intelligence, but just to suggest that such a 
prospect is quite plausible.  In any event, greater progress in useful artificial 
intelligence can be expected.  Even if AI does not actually exceed human 
intelligence, it may still offer useful insights on problems that remain un-
solved.  Such progress can be very useful for social decisionmaking by al-
lowing computers to assist humans in explaining social phenomena and 
predicting the trajectory and effects of social trends.  By 2020, computers 
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pend only on the ingenuity of researchers for testing the full range of expla-
nations of the causes of matters.34 
One way to understand this development is to see computational power 
as allowing more hypotheses to emerge from data rather than being im-
posed on the data.  Greater computational power may allow computers to 
create competition between such emerging hypotheses, with the winner be-
ing that which is objectively best supported.  Computer simulations will al-
so become more powerful and permit researchers to vary certain data from 
that which exists and see what results.35  Such simulations will help enhance 
the robustness of modeling and empiricism that help in social analysis.  The 
analytic capability of AI offers positive spillovers, because a sophisticated 
and quantitatively informed understanding of the current and future shape 
of society is a great social good, aiding citizens and politicians alike in 
coming to sound policy decisions. 
To be clear, strong AI’s social utility does not depend on predicting the 
future with precision.  Given the randomness inherent in the world, that feat 
is not possible, no matter how great the increase in intelligence.36  Even if 
AI only makes clear the possibility of unexpected future contingencies and 
offers some assessment of their likelihood with evaluation of possible solu-
tions (including out-of-the-box ideas), AI will aid in planning for the con-
tingencies. 
II. THE THREATS OF AI 
Many theorists of technology are very optimistic about the capacity of 
strong AI to substantially improve human life.  Robots powered by AI can 
make life much easier, particularly for the disabled and elderly.  AI has the 
potential to aid in discoveries that extend the human life span.  At their ex-
tremes, some theorists of technology, like Kurzweil, believe that AI will 
lead, even within fifty years, to a kind of technological utopia where people 
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Even those concerned that strong AI may threaten the existence of hu-
manity premise their fears on the view that such artificial intelligence is 
possible and relatively imminent.  For instance, Bill Joy, the former chief 
technologist for Sun Microsystems, does not disagree with Kurzweil that 
we are entering an age of unprecedented technological acceleration in 
which artificial intelligence will become vastly more powerful than it is to-
day.  But his outlook on this development is deeply pessimistic.  In a widely 
discussed article, ―Why The Future Doesn’t Need Us,‖ he raises the alarm 
that man cannot ultimately control these machines.38  The power of his cri-
tique lies precisely in his acknowledgement of the wealth of potential bene-
fits from strong AI.  But for Joy, however great the benefits of AI might be, 
the risk of losing control of the intelligence created is still greater.  It ap-
pears that in his view, man resembles the sorcerer’s apprentice—too weak 
and too ignorant to master the master machines.  Joy’s stance represents the 
culmination of a particular kind of fear that goes back to the Romantic Era 
and was first represented by the Frankenstein monster who symbolized the 
idea that ―all scientific progress is really a disguised form of destruction.‖39 
Fears of artificial intelligence on the battlefield may be an even more 
immediate concern raised by growing computational power.  Nations have 
always attempted to use technological innovation to gain advantages in 
warfare.40  Computational advance today is essential to national defense, or 
to put it more globally, sovereign military competition.  The Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) spends billions of dollars de-
veloping more advanced military mechanisms that depend on ever more 
substantial computational capacity.41 
It is hard to overstate the extent to which advances in robotics, which 
are driven by AI, are transforming the United States military.  During the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars, more and more Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs) of different kinds were used.  For example, in 2001, there were ten 
unmanned ―Predators‖ in use, and at the end of 2007, there were 180.42  
Unmanned aircraft, which depend on substantial computational capacity, 
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majority of aircraft by 2020.43  Even below the skies, robots perform impor-
tant tasks such as mine removal.44  Already in development are robots that 
would wield lasers as a kind of special infantryman focused on killing sni-
pers.45  Others will act as paramedics.46  It is not an exaggeration to predict 
that war twenty or twenty-five years from now may be fought predominant-
ly by robots.  The AI-driven battlefield gives rise to a different set of fears 
than those raised by the potential autonomy of AI.  Here, the concern is that 
human malevolence will lead to these ever more capable machines wreak-
ing ever more havoc and destruction. 
III. THE FUTILITY OF THE RELINQUISHMENT OF AI AND THE 
PROHIBITION OF BATTLEFIELD ROBOTS 
Joy argues for ―relinquishment‖—i.e., the abandonment of technolo-
gies that can lead to strong AI.  Those who are concerned about the use of 
AI technology on the battlefield would focus more specifically on weapons 
powered by AI.  But whether the objective is relinquishment or the con-
straint of new weaponry, any such program must be translated into a specif-
ic set of legal prohibitions.  These prohibitions, at least under current 
technology and current geopolitics, are certain to be ineffective.  Thus, na-
tions are unlikely to unilaterally relinquish the technology behind accelerat-
ing computational power or the research to further accelerate that 
technology. 
Indeed, were the United States to relinquish such technology, the 
whole world would be the loser.  The United States is both a flourishing 
commercial republic that benefits from global peace and prosperity, and the 
world’s hegemon, capable of supplying the public goods of global peace 
and security.  Because it gains a greater share of the prosperity that is af-
forded by peace than do other nations, it has incentives to shoulder the bur-
dens to maintain a global peace that benefits not only the United States but 
the rest of the world.47  By relinquishing the power of AI, the United States 
would in fact be giving greater incentives to rogue nations to develop it. 
Thus, the only realistic alternative to unilateral relinquishment would 
be a global agreement for relinquishment or regulation of AI-driven weapo-
nry.  But such an agreement would face the same insuperable obstacles nuc-
lear disarmament has faced.  As recent events with Iran and North Korea 
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to relinquish nuclear arms.  Not only are these weapons a source of geopo-
litical strength and prestige for such nations, but verifying any prohibition 
on the preparation and production of these weapons is a task beyond the ca-
pability of international institutions. 
The verification problems are far greater with respect to the technolo-
gies relating to artificial intelligence.  Relatively few technologies are in-
volved in building a nuclear bomb, but arriving at strong artificial 
intelligence has many routes and still more that are likely to be discovered.  
Moreover, building a nuclear bomb requires substantial infrastructure.49  Ar-
tificial intelligence research can be done in a garage.  Constructing a nuc-
lear bomb requires very substantial resources beyond that of most groups 
other than nation-states.50  Researching artificial intelligence is done by in-
stitutions no richer than colleges and perhaps would require even less sub-
stantial resources. 
Joy recognizes these difficulties, but offers no plausible solution.  In-
deed, his principal idea for implementing relinquishment shows that his ob-
jective is impossible to achieve.  He suggests that computer scientists and 
engineers take a kind of Hippocratic Oath that they will not engage in AI 
research with the potential to lead to AI that can displace the human race.51  
But many scientists would likely refuse to take the oath because they would 
not agree with Joy’s projections.  Assuming some took the oath, many gov-
ernments would likely not permit their scientists to respect it because of the 
importance of computational advances to national defense.  Even left on 
their own, scientists would likely disregard the oath because of the substan-
tial payoffs for advances in this area from private industry.  Finally, scien-
tists would have difficulty complying with such a directive even should 
they want to because of the difficulty of predicting what discoveries will 
propel AI forward in the long-run. 
For all these reasons, verifying a global relinquishment treaty, or even 
one limited to AI-related weapons development, is a nonstarter.  Indeed, the 
relative ease of performing artificial intelligence research suggests that, at 
least at current levels of technology, it would be difficult for a nation to en-
force such a prohibition on AI research directed wholly against its own res-
idents.  Even a domestic prohibition would run up against the substantial 
incentives to pursue such research because the resulting inventions can pro-
vide lucrative applications across a wider range of areas than can research 
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IV. CONCEPTUAL ERRORS IN FEARS ABOUT AI 
The threats from strong AI—both the fear that it represents an existen-
tial threat to humanity and the fear that it will lead to greater loss of life in 
war—have been exaggerated because they rest on conceptual and empirical 
confusions. 
A. The Existential Threat 
The existential threat can be dissolved if there is a substantial possibili-
ty of constructing friendly AI.52  Friendly AI is artificial intelligence that 
will not use its autonomy to become a danger to mankind.  The argument 
for friendly AI begins by rejecting the argument that advanced artificial in-
telligence will necessarily have the kind of willpower that could drive it to 
replace humanity.  The basic error in such thinking is the tendency to anth-
ropomorphize AI.53  Humans, like other animals, are genetically pro-
grammed in many instances to regard their welfare (and those of their 
relatives) as more important than the welfare of any other living thing.54  
But the reason for this motivation lies in the history of evolution: those an-
imals that put their own welfare first were more likely to succeed in distri-
buting their genes to subsequent generations.55  Artificial intelligence will 
not be the direct product of biological evolution, nor necessarily of any 
process resembling it.  Thus, it is a mistake to think of AI as necessarily 
having the all-too-human qualities that seek to evade constraints and take 
power. 
This is not to say that one cannot imagine strong AI capable of malevo-
lence.  One way to create AI, for instance, may be to replicate some aspects 
of an evolutionary process so that versions of AI progress by defeating oth-
er versions—a kind of tournament of creation.  One might think that such a 
process would be more likely to give rise to existential threats.  Further, one 
cannot rule out that a property of malevolence, or at a least a will to power, 
could be an emergent property of a particular line of AI research. 
Moreover, even a non-anthropomorphic human intelligence still could 
pose threats to mankind, but they are probably manageable threats.  The 
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human welfare.56  Thus, for instance, unless otherwise programmed, it could 
solve problems in ways that could lead to harm against humans.  But indif-
ference, rather than innate malevolence, is much more easily cured.  Artifi-
cial intelligence can be programmed to weigh human values in its 
decisionmaking.57  The key will be to assure such programming. 
The realistic prospect of wholly friendly AI is the first reason that gov-
ernment should support rather than regulate AI.  Such support can provide 
strong incentives for developers of AI to take this issue seriously.  If the 
mechanisms of artificial intelligence developed through such a program 
maintain a head start in calculating power, they can in turn be useful in 
finding ways to prevent the possible dangers that could emerge from other 
kinds of artificial intelligence.  To be sure, this approach is not a guaranteed 
route to success, but it seems much more fruitful and practicable than relin-
quishment. 
The question of how to support friendly AI is a subtle one.  The gov-
ernment lacks the knowledge to issue a set of clear requirements that a 
friendly AI project would have to fulfill.  It also lacks a sufficiently clear 
definition of what the end state of a friendly AI looks like.  This ignorance 
may inhibit establishing a prize for reaching friendly AI or even any inter-
mediate objective that makes progress toward this ultimate goal.58  The best 
way to support may be instead to treat it as a research project, like those 
funded by the National Institutes of Health.  Peer review panels of computer 
and cognitive scientists would sift through projects and choose those that 
are designed both to advance AI and assure that such advances would be 
accompanied by appropriate safeguards.59  At first, such a program should 
be quite modest and inexpensive.  Once shown to actually advance the 
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B. The Concern about Battlefield AI 
It is not as if in the absence of AI wars or weapons will cease to exist.  
The way to think about the effects of AI on war is to think of the conse-
quences of substituting technologically advanced robots for humans on the 
battlefield.  In at least three ways, that substitution is likely to be beneficial 
to humans. 
First, robots make conventional forces more effective and less vulnera-
ble to certain weapons of mass destruction, like chemical and biological 
weapons.  Rebalancing the world to make such weapons less effective, even 
if marginally so, must be counted as a benefit. 
Second, one of the reasons that conventional armies deploy lethal force 
is to protect the human soldiers against death or serious injury.  If only ro-
bots are at stake in a battle, a nation is more likely to use non-lethal force, 
such as stun guns and the like.  The United States is in fact considering out-
fitting some of its robotic forces with non-lethal weaponry. 
Third, AI-driven weaponry gives an advantage to the developed world 
and particularly to the United States, because of its advanced capability in 
technological innovation.  Robotic weapons have been among the most suc-
cessful in the fight against Al-Qaeda and other groups waging asymmetrical 
warfare against the United States.  The Predator, a robotic airplane, has 
been successfully targeting terrorists throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
and more technologically advanced versions are being rapidly developed.  
Moreover, it does so in a targeted manner without the need to launch large-
scale wars to hold territory—a process that would almost certainly result in 
more collateral damage.61  If one believes that the United States is on the 
whole the best enforcer of rules of conduct that make for a peaceful and 
prosperous world, this development must also be counted as a benefit. 
Importantly, the law of war can be adapted to the use of robots.  The 
basic requirements of the prohibition against intentionally inflicting damage 
on civilians should have no less force when the inflictors of damage are ro-
bots.  In the long run, robots, whether autonomous or not, may be able to 
discriminate better than other kinds of weapons, thus allowing a higher 
standard for avoidance of civilian deaths.62  The requirement of proportio-
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nality in war may even have more bite, since the need to protect robots from 
all injury may be less than the need to protect humans, so the force effec-
tively authorized under international law for troop protection may be pro-
portionately less.  Thus, relinquishment by the United States would be a 
grave mistake if it were substantially possible that artificial intelligence 
consistent with continued human flourishing could be constructed.63  It 
might be thought that any military exploitation of artificial intelligence is in 
tension with development of friendly AI.  But the destructive powers un-
leashed by computer-driven weaponry does not necessarily entail the crea-
tion of strong AI that would lead to computers displacing humanity as a 
whole.  Moreover, even if ultimately competition among nation-states leads 
to pressure to develop the use of strong AI in military matters, there will be 
powerful incentives for the United States to constrain the AI that drives 
such weaponry from engaging in the kind of behavior that Joy fears.  In any 
event, it is likely that the United States and other advanced industrial na-
tions can be better trusted than other nations to take account of these dan-
gers, particularly if they have an ongoing friendly AI program.  Thus, the 
combination of support for friendly AI and research into and deployment of 
computerized weaponry by the United States remains a better policy than 
the alternatives of relinquishment or disarmament. 
V. THE BENEFITS OF AI IN AN AGE OF ACCELERATING TECHNOLOGY         
We live in an age of accelerating technology.  Because of the exponen-
tial growth symbolized and exemplified by Moore’s law, technological in-
novation progresses faster than ever before.  Some theorists of technology 
believe that such acceleration has been going on throughout human histo-
ry.64  It took much less time for the industrial age to replace the era of agri-
culture than it did for that era to succeed the long eon of hunter-gathering of 
our distant past.  The post-industrial age is following on the heels of indu-
strialization more quickly still. 
Even within our own lifetimes, the quickening of the pace of change is 
palpable.  A visit to an electronics store, or even a grocery store, would find 
a whole new line of products within two years, whereas someone visiting a 
store between 1910 and 1920—let alone 1810 and 1820—would not have 
noticed much difference.  Even cultural generations move faster.  Facebook, 
for instance, has in a few years completely changed the way college stu-
dents relate,65 whereas the tenor of college life in 1960 would have been re-
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 Most importantly for society, accelerating technology is spawning a 
multitude of innovations—even fields of innovations unknown three dec-
ades ago.  Biotechnology, for instance, raises the possibility of radical life 
extension, and with it, very important changes in demography.67  Nanotech-
nology, which concerns the control and fabrication of matter smaller than 
one billionth of a meter, is also proceeding on a wide front and has already 
been incorporated into products from sunscreen to pesticides.68  While the 
field has enormous promise, it also raises potential threats.  These include 
relatively mundane threats, such as the bodily damage that tiny particles can 
cause, and much wilder scenarios in which nanomachines replicate them-
selves until the earth is destroyed.69  Beyond these specific fields, the reality 
of accelerating technology will result in wholly new disruptive innovations 
that cannot now be predicted.  But these too may rapidly shape the structure 
of society for good or ill. 
Such technological changes may sometimes require new laws, regula-
tions, and social norms to avoid their dangers and realize their promise.  But 
these technologies do not themselves directly facilitate the better informa-
tion gathering and analysis necessary to superintend these technological 
transformations.  In other words, they do not themselves directly provide 
the information conducive to the regulation and integration of accelerating 
technologies into society.  Artificial intelligence is fundamentally different 
in this respect.  Insofar as artificial intelligence remains beneficent, it facili-
tates the gathering and analysis of information that helps the regulation of 
further advances not only in its own field, but in other fields of accelerating 
technology as well.  It has the added advantage that its focus will be on the 
processing of objective information.  While the growth of AI will not end 
ideological battles over the interpretation of data, more and more objective-
ly analyzed facts provide ballast to deliberation, preventing extreme and un-
supported claims and providing an anchor to democratic consensus. 
Indeed, one way of thinking of the importance of AI is that the accele-
rating accumulation of information in the world makes mechanisms to sort 
                                                                                                                           
Kansas State University), available at http://krex.k-
state.edu/dspace/bitstream/2097/181/1/MatthewVandenBoogart2006.pdf (link). 
66
  More parochially, the publication of law review articles has changed more in the last six years 
than it did in the previous fifty.  The rise of the Social Science Research Network has made drafts of 
scholarly articles available—often long before publication.  Law reviews have responded by finding new 
ways to add value.  For example, major law reviews have added online components that sometimes 
comment on print articles.  See, e.g., Northwestern Law Review Colloquy, 
http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu (last visited Apr. 12, 2010) (link). 
67
  See GLENN REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF DAVIDS: HOW MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY EMPOWER 
ORDINARY PEOPLE TO BEAT BIG MEDIA, BIG GOVERNMENT AND OTHER GOLIATHS 175–93 (2006). 
68
  See Diana M. Bowman & Graeme A. Hodge, A Small Matter of Regulation: An International Re-
view of Nanotechnology Regulation, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007), 
http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=8&article=1 (link). 
69
  See Albert C. Lin, Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 355 
(2007) (link). 
104:366 (2010) Accelerating AI 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/12/ 381 
and analyze that information all the more necessary.70  Already, the military 
is having trouble analyzing all the information it is getting from its drones 
because it lacks sufficient sorting and analytic capacity.71  This problem is a 
metaphor for social decisionmaking as a whole.  As accelerating technology 
creates new complexity more rapidly than ever before in areas, such as na-
notechnology, biotechnology, and robotics, that were not even known a few 
decades before, social decisionmaking must struggle to keep up with ana-
lyzing the wealth of new phenomena no less than the military has struggled 
to process the ever more detailed information it receives from its modern 
technology.  Societies prosper if they can use all of the information availa-
ble to make the best decisions possible.  The problem now is that informa-
tion available to be processed may be swelling beyond human capacity to 
achieve sound social decisionmaking without the aid of AI. 
One side benefit of greater capacity to process information may be the 
ability to better predict natural catastrophes and either prevent them or take 
preemptive measures to avoid their worst consequences.  The more sophis-
ticated the simulations and modeling of earthquakes, weather, and asteroids, 
and the better aggregation of massive amounts of data on those phenomena, 
the better such measures are likely to be.72  Moreover, by estimating the 
risks of various catastrophes, society is better able to use its limited re-
sources to focus on the most serious ones. 
The acceleration of technology can create unparalleled cascades of 
benefits as well as new risks of catastrophe.  This acceleration could poten-
tially endanger the future of the human race, but could also potentially radi-
cally extend the life span of individual humans.  If such acceleration is the 
fundamental phenomenon of our age, the assessment of the consequences of 
technology is an essential task for society.  As a result, the government has 
a particular interest in accelerating the one technology that may analyze the 
rest of technological acceleration—AI.  The question of what degree and 
what form of support is warranted to boost the acceleration of this technol-
ogy to help us with decisionmaking about the rest of accelerating is subtle 
and difficult.  But that is the right question to ask, not whether we should 
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